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ACoercion: The Wrong and the Bad*
Michael Garnett
The idea of coercion serves two distinct moral functions and, correspondingly,
consists of two overlapping but distinct concepts: one that serves tomark out a type
of moral wrong, and one that serves to mark out a type of moral bad. The distinc-
tion between these two concepts holds the key to resolving a number of problems
in moral and political philosophy, including questions about the coerciveness of
the state and questions about the coerciveness of various kinds of economic trans-
action.The idea of coercion is one that has played, and continues to play, at least
two importantly distinctmoral-theoretic roles in our thinking.One, which
has been the focus of a number of recent influential treatments,1 is a pri-
marily deontic role in which claims of coercion serve to indicate relatively
weighty prima facie wrongs and excuses. The other, by contrast, is a pri-
marily axiological or eudaimonic role in which claims of coercion serve to
pick out instances of some distinctive kind of pro tanto human bad (such
as unfreedom or interpersonal subjection). As I argue in this article, this
turns out not to be a simple case of one idea put to two different uses, but
rather a case of two subtly distinct ideas in need of separate philosophical
treatment.* This article was greatly improved by the many thoughtful, careful, and constructive
comments it received. Thank you to Robyn Bluhm, Kirstin Borgerson, Danielle Bromwich,
Rowan Cruft, Ami Harbin, Matthew Kramer, Hallvard Lillehammer, Douglas MacKay, Emily
McTernan, Joseph Millum, Anthony Price, Benjamin Wald, Marika Warren, and Eliana Zur-
Szpiro; to participants at the 2016Workshop onExploitation&Coercion at CarnegieMellon
University and at the New Scholarship in Bioethics Symposia of 2014 and 2015; to audiences
at Toronto, Berkeley, and Birkbeck; and to Henry Richardson, Rainer Forst, two anonymous
reviewers, and four anonymous editors at Ethics.
1. See esp. Alan Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987);
see also Mitchell N. Berman, “The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims,” Legal Theory 8
(2002): 45–89; William A. Edmundson, Three Anarchical Fallacies: An Essay on Political Authority
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Ethics 128 (April 2018): 545–573
© 2018 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/2018/12803-0002$10.00
545
This content downloaded from 193.061.013.044 on June 19, 2018 09:04:43 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
546 Ethics April 2018
AAlthoughoften relatively neglected, the primarily eudaimonic concept
of coercion is of enduring importance to both liberal perfectionist and so-
cialist political moralities, as well as to personal ethics. This article aims to
elucidate it and to examine its relationship to its better-theorized deontic
cousin. In addition, the article seeks to show how a better understanding
of these two overlapping concepts can enable us to resolve certain impor-
tant and long-standing theoretical disputes about coercion—specifically,
the dispute over whether coercion is an essentially moralized idea, and
the dispute over whether (genuine) offers can be coercive.
The argument proceeds in the following way. Section I introduces
the weightily deontic concept of coercion and reviews some well-known ar-
guments to the effect that it requires an essentially moralized analysis.
Section II contrasts this with a primarily eudaimonic concept present in
both Bentham andMarx and of continuing significance to certain impor-
tant strands of liberal and socialist thought. Section III then takes up the
task of further elucidating this idea, arguing that (on its best understand-
ing) to be coerced is not to be prevented by others from acting, but rather
to be subjected to their foreign wills—a subtly distinct idea. In light of
this, Section IV gives an account of the relevant kind of interpersonal sub-
jection, and Section V deals with some objections. With the account in
hand, then, Section VI returns to the distinction between the deontic and
eudaimonic concepts, arguing that it enables us to provide plausible and
ethically rich analyses of a wide range of cases (including, most notably,
those involving “coercive offers”). Finally, Section VII considers some fur-
ther implications of the approach, briefly applying it by way of illustration
to the specific issue of capitalist wage relations.
I. COERCION’S WEIGHTY DEONTIC ROLE
It is often pointed out that although there may be any number of recog-
nizable senses of ‘coercion’, not all of them are morally interesting. What
is more, there has been increasing agreement that themorally interesting
senses of “A coerces B into doing x” are those that permit inferences to
one or more of three specific and relatively weighty moral conclusions.
These are (1)A acts at least prima facie wrongly, (2) it is at least prima facie
wrong to hold B fully responsible for doing x, and (3) it is at least prima
facie wrong to hold B to x (where x is the giving of consent or the making
of a promise).2 Although these claims invoke only prima facie wrongs,
strictly speaking, they are to be understood as setting relatively high justi-2. See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1986), 148–
49;Wertheimer,Coercion; Edmundson,Three Anarchical Fallacies, 74–77; Grant Lamond, “The
Coerciveness of Law,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 20 (2000): 39–62, 47–48; Berman, “Nor-
mative Functions of Coercion Claims.” Note that nothing I say here contradicts Berman’s
view that all relevant cases of (3) are in the end just cases of (2).
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Aficatory bars (the idea being, e.g., that one would need substantial moral
justification to hold a person to the terms of a contract she had been co-
erced into signing). Call these coercion’s three weighty deontic senses.3
Given this, what is it to be coerced? At least since the late sixties, a
central dispute among coercion theorists has concerned essential morali-
zation. According to the “moralizers,” any convincing analysis of coercion
must make essential reference to certain preexisting moral facts, such as
the relevant parties’ rights.4 According to the “nonmoralizers,” coercion
is amenable to a purely nonmoral analysis.5 For reasons I now very briefly
sketch, the moralizers have generally seemed to have the upper hand in
this debate.
Consider the following pair of cases:3
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ll use Private Pharmacist. B urgently needs some medicine. A, a private
pharmacist, offers to make up and sell B the medicine in return
for $50, a price that is easily affordable to B and entirely reasonable
with respect to A’s costs. B pays the $50.
Corrupt Pharmacist. B urgently needs some medicine. A, a publicly
funded pharmacist required to dispense the medicine for free, de-
mands a $50 kickback in order to hand it over. B pays the $50.6. In referring to deontological categories (such as rights, wrongs, the permissible,
permissible, etc.), and to deontological frameworks more generally, I do not mean
gest that these notions are available only to moral perspectives that are deontological
way down. Such terms may, of course, also be used by indirect consequentialists and
s who deny that these are fundamental moral concepts. Thus, use of coercion in what
alling its “deontic” role presupposes no more than a shallow commitment to the va-
of these deontological categories.
. SeeDaniel Lyons, “WelcomeThreats andCoerciveOffers,”Philosophy50 (1975): 425–
nit Haksar, “Coercive Proposals [Rawls and Gandhi],” Political Theory 4 (1976): 65–79;
n Gunderson, “Threats and Coercion,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1979): 247–59;
ey C. Ryan, “The Normative Concept of Coercion,” Mind 89 (1980): 481–98; Raz,Mo-
f Freedom; Wertheimer, Coercion; Craig L. Carr, “Coercion and Freedom,” American Phil-
cal Quarterly 25 (1988): 59–67; Harry G. Frankfurt, “Coercion and Moral Responsibil-
n The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
, 26–46; Edmundson, Three Anarchical Fallacies; Berman, “Normative Functions of Co-
Claims.”
. See David Zimmerman, “Coercive Wage Offers,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 10
): 121–45; Michael Gorr, “Toward a Theory of Coercion,” Canadian Journal of Philos-
6 (1986): 383–405; Lamond, “Coerciveness of Law”; Denis G. Arnold, “Coercion and
Responsibility,” American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001): 53–67; Scott Anderson,
heories of Coercion, Two Axes, and the Importance of the Coercer,” Journal of Moral
ophy 5 (2008): 394–422; Jan-Willem van der Rijt, “Coercive Interference and Moral
ent,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2011): 549–67.
. See Wertheimer, Coercion, 207–8. See this work generally for many more such exam-
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AIn both cases, B has little choice but to pay up. Yet it is reasonable to
think that inCorrupt Pharmacist A acts wrongly, whereas in Private Pharma-
cist she does not, and that whereas in Corrupt Pharmacist B could justifi-
ably seek to recover his $50 on the grounds that his payment was coerced,
in Private Pharmacist he could not. So only Corrupt Pharmacist seems to in-
volve coercion in the “morally interesting” senses just described. Never-
theless, the cases are descriptively similar: in both, A refuses to dispense the
medicine unless B hands over $50. Thus, the relevant difference seems to
lie not, say, in any purely structural features of B’s choice situation (such as
the shape of B’s opportunity set), nor in any descriptive details of A’s
immediate actions, but rather in the background distribution of rights—
specifically, in whether or not B has a prior right to the medicine. If this
is correct, then since what distinguishes the cases is a moral fact, and since
only one of the cases involves coercion, it seems likely that coercion re-
quires an essentially moralized analysis.7
Consideration of such cases therefore seems to draw us toward a
moralized account, according to which (roughly) A coerces B only if A
proposes to violate B’s all-things-considered rights.8 Note that, on this ap-
proach, merely proposing to violate B’s prima facie rights is insufficient
for coercion, since prima facie rights are too lightweight to do justice
to coercion’s weighty deontic roles. Thus, suppose that I threaten to stop
you from climbing into my walled garden unless you first sign a certain
contract. Although restricting your freedomofmovement is a prima facie
rights violation, I do not thereby coerce you into signing the contract—at
least, not in any of the “morally interesting” senses currently at issue (e.g.,
the contract is not thereby invalid). Instead, a proposal to violate some-
one’s prima facie rights is merely prima facie coercive.7. Of course, given that moral properties supervene on nonmoral ones, it should al-
ways be possible in principle—if one is willing to look hard and far enough—to find a non-
moral difference to match the moral one. The point of this type of argument is therefore
not to prove that there can be no purely descriptive differences between coercion and
noncoercion cases, but rather to suggest that what makes such differences relevant (when
they are) is simply that certain moral differences supervene upon them.
8. Less roughly, I take a “moralized account of coercion” to be any account committed
to the following claims (each corresponds to one of the three weighty deontic senses of co-
ercion distinguished above): (1) A issues B with a coercive proposal in the sense relevant to
determining whether A does wrong only if A proposes to violate someone’s rights in order to
secure B’s compliance; (2) where x is a presumptive wrong, A coerces B into doing x in the
sense relevant to determining B’s blameworthiness only if it is not wrong, or not as gravely
wrong, for B to do x given the nature of A’s proposal (and other relevant facts); (3) where
x is the making of some agreement with A, it is normally the case that A coerces B into doing
x in the sense relevant to determining whether B is morally bound by x only if A secures B’s
compliance by threatening to act in violation of someone’s rights. (For guidance as to the
likely exceptions with respect to the last of these claims, see Berman, “Normative Functions
of Coercion Claims,” 78.)
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AOthers have ably defended the details of this approach, and I do not
recapitulate their arguments here. Instead, I note two quite general wor-
ries about it as a theory ofmorally interesting coercion, both of whichhave
some merit, and both of which I hope to address in this article. The first
concerns the way in which essential moralization seems to prevent the idea
of coercion from functioning as a basicmoral concept and therefore from
playing a foundational role in our moral and political theories.9 I briefly
return to this metatheoretical limitation of the approach later. The second
worry, which I pursue now, stems from a more prosaic concern: problem
cases.
Consider the following:9
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ll use Personal Ultimatum. A and B are dating. B is powerfully in love with A
and cannot imagine any worthwhile life without A. A does not feel
the same and is also irritated by B’s religious practices. A makes it
known that unless B severs ties with B’s religious community, A will
unilaterally terminate their relationship. B pleads with A to with-
draw the ultimatum; A stands firm, and B complies.
Organ Sale. B is in extreme poverty, a situation for which A bears no
direct responsibility. A offers to pay B $1,000 for one of B’s kidneys,
a sum far below its general market price. Seeing no other possible
source of income, B accepts.
Legal Penalty. B often drinks and drives. The government (A) passes
a law threatening a fair penalty for anyone found driving while drunk.
B, though personally opposed to the law, complies with it so as to
avoid the penalty.On amoralized account, and given reasonable auxiliary assumptions, none
of these cases involve coercion. This is because, plausibly, B has no all-
things-considered right that A continue to date B (in Personal Ultimatum),
no all-things-considered right to any of A’s money (inOrgan Sale), and no
all-things-considered right not to be fairly penalized for drunk driving (in
Legal Penalty).10 Nevertheless, the intuition that B suffers coercion in one
or more of these cases is extremely common.11. See David Zimmerman, “Taking Liberties: The Perils of ‘Moralizing’ Freedom and
ion in Social Theory and Practice,” Social Theory and Practice 28 (2002): 577–609; Ian
r, “Value-Freeness and Value-Neutrality in the Analysis of Political Concepts,” in Ox-
udies in Political Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall
rd: Oxford University Press, 2015), 279–306.
0. SeeWertheimer,Coercion, 211; Berman, “Normative Functions of CoercionClaims,”
1. See, among others, Theodore Benditt, “Threats and Offers,” Personalist 58 (1977):
4; Joel Feinberg,TheMoral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol. 3,Harm to Self (Oxford:Oxford
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AOf course, the moralizers have a predictable response to cases like
these. It is that although such cases may involve coercion in some sense,
this is not what is (or should be) at issue.What should be at issue is whether
they involve coercion in amorally interesting sense. And, according to them,
coercion claims are morally interesting only when they support moral in-
ferences of the three weighty deontic kinds described above (e.g., to the
effect that B did not validly consent to selling B’s kidney, or that the state
acts wrongly in threatening penalties for drunk driving). Only then, ac-
cording to Mitchell Berman, do coercion claims “do real normative work”;
indeed, “these are the only normative functions such claims serve.”12 Simi-
larly, although all three cases involve whatmight be deemed “hard choices,”
according toAlanWertheimer, “hard choices which do not arise from injus-
tice are not coercive in any important moral sense.”13
But this is too quick. Those who hold that some or all of these cases
involve coercion may take this claim to carry a moral force different from
the weighty deontic force on which proponents of themoralized account
exclusively focus. For instance, even those willing to concede that in these
cases A acts strictly within A’s all-things-considered rights, and therefore
not wrongly in a narrow (rights-violating) sense, may nevertheless wish to
say that in some of them A acts badly. And although we may concede that
in these cases B suffers no all-things-considered rights violation, wemight
nevertheless wish to recognize a distinctive sense in which B’s life goes
pro tanto worse by virtue of being on the wrong side of the relevant power
relations. Even if they are not directly relevant to questions of right and
wrong, then, such coercion claims may nevertheless be relevant to ques-
tions of good and bad.
II. COERCION’S EUDAIMONIC FORCE
The primary aim of this article is to vindicate the common intuition that
cases like the three just introduced are indeed coercive. The proposal isUniversity Press, 1986), 215, 233; Lamond, “Coerciveness of Law”; Emily A. Largent et al.,
“Money, Coercion and Undue Inducement: Attitudes about Payments to Research Partici-
pants,” IRB: Ethics and Human Research 34 (2012): 1–8. Of course, the moralized account
may—especially with respect toLegal Penalty—be able to yield the conclusion that B is coerced
prima facie. The problem, however, is thatmany seem to think that in these cases B is coerced
all things considered.
12. Berman, “Normative Functions of Coercion Claims,” 48 (emphasis added).
13. Wertheimer, Coercion, 234 (emphasis added). Note that, despite this statement,
and in contrast to some other coercion theorists, Wertheimer in fact has a relatively gen-
erous view of the possible moral force of coercion claims. In addition to the three roles
discussed, he allows that such claims may also serve to show that B’s choice is “rooted in
social injustice,” such that there is a “(rebuttable) case for themitigation of B’s background
conditions” (234). Furthermore, Wertheimer is willing to concede that the language of co-
ercion applied to hard choices as such may carry a certain eudaimonic moral force (233),
albeit not the one I go on to explore.
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Athat the idea of coercion plays for us two distinct but overlapping moral
roles. One is a weighty deontic role, the point of which is to help us to nav-
igate within the moral law. The other is a primarily axiological or eudai-
monic role, thepoint of which is tohelpus to identify certainhumangoods
and bads that contribute toward or detract from the flourishing of human
lives. For the well-trodden reasons briefly surveyed in Section I, I take the
moralized account to be a broadly correct elucidation of coercion as it
functions in its weighty deontic role. However, I now seek to supplement
this with an account of coercion as it functions in its primarily eudaimonic
role, arguing that the two accounts taken together promise to yield amor-
ally rich understanding of coercion.
It is worth noting that the distinction between a concept’s primarily
deontic and eudaimonic roles is one that also applies to a numberof other
moral concepts. For instance, StephenDarwall draws a distinction between
what he calls “autonomy as benefit” and “autonomy as demand.”14 Tak-
ing his example, suppose that a child does not want to eat her broccoli.
There is a certain good involved in a child’s making her own decisions
about what to eat; this is the good of autonomy or self-determination. In-
sofar as we wish to act in the child’s interests, we ought to give weight to
this. Nevertheless, the child has other interests too, and wemay therefore
be justified, all things considered, in forcing her to eat her broccoli. By
contrast, suppose that a competent adult does not want to eat her broc-
coli. From the perspective of her good,matters are structurally similar: like
the child, autonomy forms part, but only part, of her good. Unlike the
child, however, the adult also has a weighty claim to a certain form of inter-
personal respect that grounds a right to decide such matters for herself;
this is the right of autonomy or self-determination. Thus, forcing an adult
to eat her broccoli not only compromises but also violates her autonomy,
meaning that it transgresses against a particular form of moral duty and
does her a distinctive type of moral wrong. So in speaking of the adult’s
“autonomy” we may have in mind either of two things: an aspect of her
good, or her right to certain forms of treatment.15
In a similar vein, consider liberty, understood “negatively” as nonin-
terference. For somewithin the liberal tradition, such as J. S.Mill, the free-
dom to act without obstruction or hindrance by others is an important
part of what it is to live a flourishing human life.16 For theorists such as14. Stephen Darwall, “The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of the Will,” Ethics 116
(2006): 263–84, 265.
15. Note that one may accept a version of this distinction even if one believes that the
latter is ultimately derivable from the former.
16. JohnStuartMill,OnLiberty (London: Parker, 1859). See alsoWilhelmvonHumboldt,
The Limits of State Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); John Rawls, ATheory
of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); and (for an excellent general dis-
cussion) Ian Carter, A Measure of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 32–67.
This content downloaded from 193.061.013.044 on June 19, 2018 09:04:43 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
552 Ethics April 2018
Athese, the idea of negative liberty plays a primarily eudaimonic role, inas-
much as it serves to pick out an aspect of, or an essential means to, the
good. By contrast, for others—in particular, for “libertarians” such as Rob-
ert Nozick—negative liberty plays a primarily deontic role, serving to pick
out the absence of a formofmoral wrong (specifically, a “border-crossing”
or property-right violation).17 Hence, when critics of unrestrained capital-
ism point out that to lack property in a private property system is to suffer
considerable interference, and so to lack liberty, they typically deploy ‘lib-
erty’ in the broadly eudaimonic sense whereby lives go badly insofar as their
possibilities are curtailed.18 By contrast, when defenders of capitalism reply
that so long as one has suffered no illegitimate interference one enjoys per-
fect liberty, they deploy ‘liberty’ in the alternative deontic sense whereby
infringements of liberty are necessarily wrongful.19
My claim is that the idea of coercion plays a similar dual role. As we
have seen, we often take the fact that a course of action would be coercive
to strongly suggest that it would be impermissible to do it and the fact that
an agreement has been coerced to strongly suggest that it would be imper-
missible to enforce its terms. Yet we also sometimes take the fact that a per-
son is subject to pervasive coercion to indicate that her life is going badly,
in that there are important human goods that she lacks. Indeed, as I now
briefly illustrate, appreciating the latter fact is essential to understanding
the role that coercion has played (and continues to play) in certain impor-
tant political traditions.
Consider, for instance, Jeremy Bentham’s influential view that law is
inherently coercive.20 Given his broader theoretical commitments, this is
clearly not best read as a thesis about rights: it is not, say, the claim that
every law is a prima facie violation of natural right, a claim that he would
have regarded as “simple nonsense.”21 Rather, its intended moral force is
that every law involves some pro tanto setback to our interests. Thus, the
“evil of coercion,” Bentham tells us, is “the pain which it gives a man not to17. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Basic, 1974).
18. See Serena Olsaretti, Liberty, Desert and the Market: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004); G. A. Cohen, “Freedom andMoney,” inOn the Currency of
Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy, ed. Michael Otsuka (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2011), 166–92.
19. See G. Barnes, “Why Is Coercion Unjust? Olsaretti vs. the Libertarian,” Analysis 72
(2012): 457–65; G. A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995). (I revisit this dialectic in Sec. VII.) In addition to autonomy and
liberty, note that the idea of subjection to a foreign will also has both a eudaimonic and
a deontic face. For a deontic treatment of the notion, see Arthur Ripstein, Force and Free-
dom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
20. Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General, ed. H. L. A. Hart (London: Athlone, 1970).
21. Jeremy Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies,” in Selected Writings on Utilitarianism, ed.
Ross Harrison (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth, 2001), 405.
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Abe able to do the act, whatever it be, which by the apprehension of the
punishment he is deterred from doing.”22 In Bentham’s view, therefore,
coercion is not wrong in that it violates our rights; rather, it is bad in that
it diminishes our utility.Moreover, the basic Benthamite thesis that all duty-
imposing laws, even rightful ones, carry a special justificatory burden
in view of their coerciveness is one that continues to play an important
role in contemporary liberal thought, notwithstanding the general jetti-
soning of his narrow utilitarian framework. In particular, it helps under-
write the familiar move from the idea that there is a presumption in favor
of freedom to the idea that there is a presumption in favor of smaller states
(that is, states with fewer or less onerous laws). And since a rightful law is,
by definition, not wrongful, this is a thesis that is very difficult to square
with standard moralized accounts of coercion (as we saw with Legal Pen-
alty).23
In a different vein, consider Karl Marx’s claim that proletarian labor
is “coerced.”24 Again, this is not best interpreted as a claim about rights, a
concept for which Marx also had little time; it does not appear, for in-
stance, as part of a discussion concerning the validity of contracts. In-
stead, the claim is made in the course of Marx’s discussion of alienation,
where it is intended to help describe and make sense of the “external
character of labour for the worker . . . the fact that it is not his own, but
someone else’s.”25 The thought is that one aspect of a worker’s alien-
ation under capitalism lies in the way in which she is, qua worker, subject
to the will of her employer and so suffers pervasive coercion in the sense
of suffering a specific failure of human flourishing. This, in turn, consti-
tutes one plank of the traditional socialist critique of capitalism, that is,
that capitalist wage relations systematically diminish workers as human
beings and impoverish them with respect to important human goods.
If we are to have any hope ofmaking sense of what theorists like Ben-
tham, Marx, and their various followers have in mind in appealing to co-
ercion, then wemust recognize that this idea, like those of autonomy and
liberty, is capable of playing not only a weightily deontic but also a primar-
ily eudaimonic role in our moral thinking. What is more, recognizing
these dual moral-theoretic roles opens the door to understanding what
is going on in the three cases introduced at the end of Section I. For al-
though these cases may not involve proposals to violate others’ all-things-22. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1907), 175.
23. See also Haksar, “Coercive Proposals,” 73–74; Edmundson, Three Anarchical Falla-
cies; Anderson, “Of Theories of Coercion,” 412–14.
24. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin Milligan
(Mineola, NY: Dover, 2007), 72.
25. Ibid., 72–73.
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Aconsidered rights, and therefore coercion in its weighty deontic senses,
they all (as I argue below) involve coercion in a eudaimonic sense. More-
over, since (as I also argue below) the latter notion of coercion is amena-
ble to a nonmoralized analysis, recognizing coercion’s dual roles also en-
ables us to resolve the ongoing dispute about essential moralization.III. COERCION AND PREVENTION
Tomake good on these promises, wewill need amore precise understand-
ing of coercion as it functions in its eudaimonic role. This means homing
in on the exact moral bad that the concept serves to pick out.
Here is a start: coercion is essentially an enemy of freedom, and free-
dom is an important humangood. So talk of (eudaimonic) coercion serves
to track losses of (eudaimonic) freedom. That seems right. The next step,
then, is to characterize the relevant notion of freedom.Ononewell-known
analysis, freedom is fundamentally a matter of not being prevented by
others from acting.26 Call this freedom-as-nonprevention. The view that coer-
cion essentially defeats freedom-as-nonprevention, that is, that coercion
always serves to prevent people fromperforming actions (or combinations
of actions) that they would otherwise be able to perform, is widely held.27
Moreover, it suggests an answer to our current question, namely, that the
distinctive moral bad of coercion is the closing off of possibilities for ac-
tion. This is a view that merits careful examination.
I now argue, contrary to this view, that although coercion usually does
serve to close off agents’ options, it need not do so. The type of freedom
that coercion necessarily defeats—and that it is the moral job of the eudai-
monic concept of coercion to track—is not freedom-as-nonprevention,
but a subtly distinct kind that I call freedom-as-nonsubjection. Both kinds of
freedom are important human goods. Nevertheless, what matters funda-
mentally for coercion is whether, in acting, one’s will is subject to, deter-
mined by, or under the control of the will of another, and not whether
one’s prospective actions are blocked by the actions of another. In this sec-26. Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty, ed. Isaiah Berlin
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 118–72; Hillel Steiner, “Individual Liberty,” Pro-
ceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1974): 33–50; Carter, Measure of Freedom; Matthew H.
Kramer, The Quality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
27. See, e.g., Bentham, according to whom the “evil of coercion” is just the evil of “re-
straint” (Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 175); see also Chris-
tine Swanton, “Robert Stevens on Offers,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1989): 472–
75, 475; Zimmerman, “CoerciveWageOffers,” 134; AlanWertheimer and Franklin G.Miller,
“Payment for Research Participation: A Coercive Offer?,” Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (2008):
389–92, 390.
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Ation I explain why coercion is not essentially amatter of prevention, and in
the next section I give an account of freedom-as-nonsubjection.28
It is relatively easy to show that coercionneednot reduceoptions over-
all. For instance, consider the following case:2
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ll use Forced Escape. B is a prisoner who has spent most of her life in jail
and, as a result, has become profoundly “institutionalized,” terrified
of being cut free from the rules and routines of the prison. During a
prison riot, B finds herself with an opportunity to escape, albeit one
she has no intention of taking. For reasons unknown, a fellow pris-
oner, A, threatens to beat B up unless she escapes, and B does so.On any plausible account of coercion, B was coerced into escaping.
Moreover, had she not been coerced, she would have remained in prison,
and so she would now (after the riot) have far fewer options than she cur-
rently does. Being subject to coercion has therefore significantly increased
her options. So coercion does not necessarily reduce options.
A similar case shows the same with respect to coercive proposals:Corrupt Warden. B, a prisoner, is terrified by the prospect of life out-
side of jail. A, the warden, knows that B has important information
related to a recent riot. However, B is disinclined to snitch on her fel-
low prisoners. In order to get B to talk, therefore, A proposes the fol-
lowing: either B talks, or A will arrange (by some corrupt process) for
B to be released from jail immediately. Given B’s psychological state,
the threat is extremely effective.Here B receives a coercive proposal, but her options are not thereby re-
stricted: to the contrary, they are dramatically increased.29 So neither co-
ercion itself nor receipt of a coercive proposal need reduce options.308. As I explain below, what I here call “freedom-as-nonsubjection” is importantly dis-
rom the republican conception of freedom known as “freedom-as-nondomination.”
hilip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon,
; Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cam-
e: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
9. Lest it be claimed that the warden’s proposal is in fact an offer—and so neither a
nor coercive—for the very reason that it increases B’s options, note that almost every
account of the distinction between offers and threats classes it as a threat. See Steiner,
idual Liberty”; Gorr, “Toward a Theory of Coercion”; Feinberg, Harm to Self, 216–18;
orality of Freedom, 148–49; Wertheimer, Coercion, 202–21; Robert Stevens, “Coercive Of-
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (1988): 83–95; Swanton, “Robert Stevens onOffers”;
t Nozick, “Coercion,” in Socratic Puzzles (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
, 15–44; Andrew Hetherington, “The Real Distinction between Threats and Offers,”
Theory and Practice 25 (1999): 211–42.
0. Cf. Carter,Measure of Freedom, 229–30. Although we are currently interested in coer-
n its eudaimonic sense, it is worth noting that the same lesson applies to coercion in its
ty deontic sense, for A’s proposal violates B’s all-things-considered right to be treated
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ANevertheless, these lessons are not strictly to the point, for few deny
that coercion may sometimes be good on balance (think, e.g., of justified
paternalism). So given that coercion is bad only pro tanto, the issue is not
whether coercion essentially reduces options overall, but whether it nec-
essarily eliminates at least one significant option. And there is good reason
to believe that it does. For as has often been pointed out, a threat to bring
about C if you do x always seems to eliminate the conjunctive option of do-
ing xwithoutC coming to obtain.31 In Forced Escape, for example,A’s threat
denies B the option of remaining safely in jail, and in Corrupt Warden A’s
threat prevents B from staying in jail without snitching. So a plausible sup-
position may be that coercion is pro tanto bad inasmuch as it always elim-
inates at least one significant option, and that this is what the eudaimonic
concept of coercion is designed to track.
Plausible as it is, however, this supposition must ultimately be aban-
doned, for three reasons. First, in order to be prevented fromdoing x with-
out C coming to obtain, it must be the case that, were you to do x, C would
in fact come toobtain. But this is not always the case, for the threatmay be a
bluff, or it may, though sincere, be one that fails to materialize for some
unforeseeable reason. Thus, suppose that, unbeknownst to anyone, it is
the case that were you to defy a highwayman’s demand he would collapse
from a heart attack. Not knowing this, you fearfully hand over yourmoney,
and he continues on his way. You have been coerced. But youhave not, as it
happens, actually been prevented from doing anything, for (unbeknownst
to you) you had the option of retaining your money unharmed all along.
Somewill be tempted to reply that, in this case, you were prevented by your
ignorance. Yet even if ignorance can be a form of prevention, your igno-31. J. P. Day, “Threats, Offers, Law, Opinion and Liberty,” American Philosophical Quar-
terly 14 (1977): 257–72; Feinberg,Harm to Self, 192; Raz,Morality of Freedom, 150; Carter,Mea-
sure of Freedom, 224–32; Kramer, Quality of Freedom, 195–204. Note that, on this view, a threat
to bring about C if you do x leaves the atomic option of doing x intact. Against this, Philip
Pettit has argued that such a threat is better understood as eliminating the atomic option
(Pettit, On the People’s Terms, 50–56). Briefly put, he takes options to be individuated by their
desiderative features, and so, since a threat constitutes a new desiderative feature, he sees
attaching C to x as a way of removing the original option (and replacing it with a new, less
attractive one). However, although Pettit frames his position as a rival to the view that
choice can be restricted only by prevention, this dispute nevertheless ultimately boils down
just to one about which option is prevented (i.e., the conjunctive option or the original
atomic option). For this reason, I treat Pettit’s theory of interference (or at least of “objec-
tive” interference; see ibid., 54–56) as simply a nonconjunctive variant of the “prevention”
view currently under discussion.
with due process, and B is morally entitled to yield to it. So, again, B is coerced—despite the
increase in options.
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Arance of this particular fact was not brought about by another person. So
still no one has prevented you from retaining your money unharmed.32
Second, offers generally involve no loss of options, and some (such
as that inOrgan Sale) are coercive. Of course, the claim that offers can co-
erce is controversial. But there are only two general reasons for doubting
that they can coerce, neither of which applies here. The first is that offers
are not normally wrongful, a consideration that pertains to coercion in its
deontic senses and that is therefore irrelevant in the present context. The
second is that offers increase rather than decrease options, a consider-
ation that is question begging in the present context. So there is no rea-
son here to disavow the intuition that offers can coerce.
Third, even if it were the case that all coercive proposals reduce op-
tions, our aim is to understand the badness of coercion itself. And receiv-
ing a coercive proposal is insufficient for coercion, for you are coerced
only when you succumb to a coercive proposal.33 The problem is there-
fore that, once you have received the proposal (“Yourmoney or your life”),
you have lost the relevant conjunctive option regardless of what you sub-
sequently choose to do, and therefore regardless of whether any actual co-
ercion ensues. If you stand up to the threat (“Goon, shootme!”), youhave
not been coerced, but you have lost the relevant options all the same. So
even were prevention an essential feature of receiving a coercive proposal
(which it is not, in viewof thefirst two points above), it would still not be an
essential feature of coercion itself.
A possible response to this final point might be that, nevertheless,
the harm of being coerced is fully explained by the harm of receiving a
coercive proposal. After all, it may be asked, once one has received the
proposal, what additional bad could there be in acquiescing? Yet there
is indeed such an additional bad—and, correlatively, a special good in
standing firm against those who try to push us around, defying those who
try to bend us to their wills, and resisting those who try to control us. If
we do not understand this, we struggle to understand a good deal of hu-
man experience (e.g., the motivations and rallying cries of many libera-
tion movements).34 Of course, these goods and bads are strictly pro tanto—32. Could the relevant bad be just the mere loss of options, as opposed to prevention
by others? No, for many things restrict our options—fallen trees, poor health, the innocent
preferences of others—and not all of these are instances of coercion.
33. Compare deception: one might receive a deceptive communication, but unless
one actually falls for it one has not been deceived, and there has not in fact been any de-
ception. See Michael D. Bayles, “A Concept of Coercion,” in Coercion, ed. James Roland
Pennock and John W. Chapman (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1972), 16–29, 19;
Wertheimer, Coercion, 203; Lamond, “Coerciveness of Law,” 52.
34. See Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1981), 49; Anderson, “Of Theories of Coercion,” 409–10.
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Astanding up to a gunman is likely to be bad for one’s eudaimonic state
overall—and a well-designed coercive proposal will arrange your options
such that, even with the special value of defiance factored in, it remains in
your overall interest to yield. But this does not undermine the claim that
such a special value obtains. And unlike freedom-as-nonprevention, this
good—which I call freedom-as-nonsubjection—is one that is uniquely de-
feated by coercion itself.
IV. SUBJECTION TO FOREIGN WILLS
So coercion is not essentially a form of prevention. I have claimed that it
is instead a form of interpersonal subjection. But what, exactly, is that?
The language of interpersonal subjection can be used to pick out a
number of importantly different ideas. For instance, Arthur Ripstein in-
vokes the idea of one’s being “subject to the choice of another” as a way
of drawing attention to a certain fundamental class of rights violation.35
By contrast, I use it here to pick out a particular kind of eudaimonic bad.
Differently, Philip Pettit uses the term “subjection to the will of another”
(or, more famously, “domination”) to refer to the absence of a certain
type of counterfactually robust noninterference.36 For him, B is subject
to A’s will, or dominated by A, just in case A has the capacity to interfere
arbitrarily in B’s choices. By contrast, I here employ the idea of subjec-
tion to a foreign will not as a conception of domination, but as a concep-
tion of interference. That is, for me the idea of interpersonal subjection
constitutes a rival to the prevention-based interpretation of the basic
idea of active interference that lies at the foundation of both negative
and republican accounts of liberty. Moreover, I here take no view as to
which of these (i.e., subjection or prevention) is the more appropriate
for republicans to plug into their accounts of domination, focusing in-
stead just on showing that what I call freedom-as-nonsubjection is the
crucial idea when it comes to understanding coercion.3735. Ripstein, Force and Freedom. He also appeals to this idea in articulating an account
of coercion as it functions in its weighty deontic roles.
36. Pettit, Republicanism; Pettit, On the People’s Terms.
37. For his part, Pettit understands ‘interference’ in something like the traditional
negative sense of intentional or negligent prevention (see n. 31). I note that one drawback
of this is that it forces him to insist that refusable, “nonmesmerizing” offers are always
noninterfering, thereby preventing him from seeing those vulnerable to receipt of “coer-
cive” offers, such as B in Organ Sale, as victims of domination. See Pettit, On the People’s
Terms, 53–54; Philip Pettit, “Republican Freedom: Three Axioms, Four Theorems,” in Re-
publicanism and Political Theory, ed. Cecile Laborde and John Maynor (Oxford: Blackwell,
2008), 115–16. This is something that could be avoided by adopting the account of inter-
personal subjection proposed here in place of Pettit’s account of interference. Moreover,
although I am happy to accept the republican point that mere vulnerability to coercion is
its own distinctive type of eudaimonic bad, I here take no view on the broader dispute be-
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AThis clarified, I take there to be three basic ways in which A might
subject B to her will. First, A might physically obstruct or compel B in ac-
cordance with her will (e.g., by pushing B through a door). Second, she
might arrange B’s options in such a way that B has no eligible alternative
but to do as she wills (e.g., by making a threat). Third, she might arrange
B’s preferences such that B is herself motivated to do as she wills (e.g., by
manipulation or indoctrination). Each of these modes of subjection pres-
ents its own theoretical challenges and requires its own philosophical ac-
count. A complete theory of interpersonal subjection would provide analy-
ses of all three. Here I provide an account only of the second.38
This second mode of interpersonal subjection may be understood
in terms of three more basic ideas. The first is that of forced action: to be
subject to a foreign will in this second way, B must take herself to have
“no choice”—that is, no reasonable, bearable, or eligible choice—but
to do as she does.39 The second is that of interpersonality: the forced aspect
of B’s action must have been brought about in the right way by another
person’s will. Finally, the third idea is that of foreignness: A’s will must be38. All threemodes suffice for coercion in the eudaimonic sense. Note that there is an
important distinction between A’s subjecting B to her will, which is something that A does,
and B’s merely being subject to A’s will, which is something that happens to B. To see the
difference, suppose that your husband is a violent person, prone to striking out in rage
when he doesn’t get his way, and that you therefore have “no choice” but to cater to his
wishes. It may be that he does not intend to have this effect on you—indeed, he may be
so self-absorbed as to be generally oblivious to the effects of his violent conduct. In that
case he does not subject you to his will, but you are nevertheless subject to his will. See
Michael Garnett, “The Autonomous Life: A Pure Social View,” Australasian Journal of Philos-
ophy 92 (2014): 143–58. This broader, nonintentional form of interpersonal subjection
constitutes a significant form of unfreedom in itself, and one that remains essentially inter-
personal in a sense sufficient to distinguish its harm from that of mere forced action. More-
over, its nonintentional character makes it particularly helpful when it comes to thinking
about contexts of structural oppression. Nevertheless, I take the language of “coercion” to
pick out the narrower, active form specifically, and this is what I focus on here. (The broader
notion may, however, be understood in terms of the analysis of “active” subjection given
below, albeit with condition [2] replaced by the weaker requirement that there merely be
some explanatory connection between B’s forced action and A’s relevant desires.)
39. Such forced action is in itself a eudaimonic bad, inasmuch as life generally goes
better when we are not forced down certain paths by hard choices (Raz,Morality of Freedom,
373–77; see also Wertheimer, Coercion, 233). However, interpersonal subjection is a partic-
ular kind of forced action that carries with it a further bad: in these cases, one is not only
forced to act but also forced to subordinate one’s own purposes to those of another.
tween negative and republican theorists as to whether its absence also constitutes a distinc-
tive and valuable form of political liberty. See Matthew H. Kramer, “Liberty and Domina-
tion,” in Republicanism and Political Theory, ed. Cecile Laborde and John Maynor (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2008), 31–57; Ian Carter, “How Are Power and Unfreedom Related?,” in Repub-
licanism and Political Theory, ed. Cecile Laborde and John Maynor (Oxford: Blackwell,
2008), 58–82; Pettit, “Republican Freedom”; Pettit, On the People’s Terms.
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Arelevantly alien to B. Simply put, then, to be subjected to a foreign will is
to be (1) forced to act (2) by and in accordance with another will (3) that
is not in conformity with one’s own. Less simply, but more precisely: in
doing x, B has been subjected to A’s will if
1. B does x on the basis of a belief that doing x is her sole available
means of avoiding an eventuality that would, in relevant respects,
surpass some appropriate threshold of badness;
2. A has successfully acted so as to get B to do x, either by helping
tomake B’s belief true (if it is true) or by helping to make B have
the belief (if it is false); and
3. it is not the case that, in getting B to do x, A is motivated only by
a set of considerations that effectively motivates B to do x.40
Thus, in giving your money to the highwayman, you have been subjected
to his will in virtue of the facts that (1) you give him your money on the
basis of a belief that this is your sole available means of avoiding getting
shot, (2) he has gotten you to give him your money by helping to make it
the case that this is your sole availablemeans of avoiding getting shot, and
(3) he has done this because he needs some ready cash, and his need for
ready cash is not what motivates you to hand over your money. I now ex-
plain these conditions in more detail.
There are three points to make about (1), the forced action condi-
tion. First, while the eventuality that B seeks to avert may of course be
more or less bad, and while the degree of its badness will partly determine
the degree to which B is subject to a foreign will, there is nevertheless
some threshold of badness below which B is not at all subject to a foreign
will. Consider an extremely trivial threat, such as a threat to pour your tea
down the sink.We are not to say that, in complying with such a threat, you
are subject to a foreign will, though only to a tiny degree. Rather, in such a
case you are in no way subject to a foreign will, for you fully retain the op-
tion (in the relevant sense of ‘option’) of standing up to the threat and of
doing as you otherwise wish.41 In thinking about the location of this
threshold, I have in mind something like inconsistency with what Joseph
Raz calls personal needs: “the conditions necessary to enable a person to40. As regards this last condition, it should further be specified that B’s motivations
for doing x are not themselves the intended or foreseen effect of some prior instance of
interpersonal subjection (specifically, of the third of the three modes of subjection distin-
guished above). On this, see Michael Garnett, “Freedom and Indoctrination,” Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society 115 (2014): 93–108, 100.
41. The same goes for offers to improve already-satisfactory situations, such as an offer
to further increase a generous salary. Serena Olsaretti makes a similar point; see Olsaretti,
Liberty, Desert and the Market, 157. (I assume in both cases that the relevant parties’ evalua-
tive schemes are not wildly abnormal.)
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Ahave the life he or she has or has set upon.”42 Nevertheless, since the ex-
istence of such a threshold is crucial to the structure of the account but its
exact location is not, I am minded to leave the latter issue open. Readers
may therefore consider the threshold to be located wherever they deem
appropriate (modulo my choice of examples).
The secondpoint is that the agent’s position in relation to this thresh-
old is not to be assessed holistically, but only in relevant respects. Suppose
that I suffer from chronic back pain severe enough to place me below the
appropriate threshold but am otherwise well-off. Youmake a trivial threat:
you threaten to say something slightly mean unless I do what you want. In
this case, defiance will leave me below the threshold, since it will involve
continued back pain—but you have not subjected me to your will. This
is because the respect in which defiance will leave me under the threshold
is irrelevant to your proposal; it is not in the domain of “having mean
things said about me” that I will fall short.
The final point concerns the idea of a means to avoidance of an in-
eligible alternative. In the sense at issue, forced action requires someman-
ner of “external” compulsion, not merely compulsion by the strength of
one’s motivations themselves. When your favorite band plays a concert
in your hometown, you are not forced to go to the concert simply on the
grounds that not going would be, for you, unbearably bad. Similarly, you
are not forced to comply with someone’s wishes just because you very
muchwant to do as they wish, or because the idea of not doing as they wish
is unthinkable for you.43 So although there may be some sense in which
performing a highly desired action is ipso facto a means of avoiding a
bad alternative (i.e., that of one’s not performing it), this is not the sense
at issue. Instead, ‘means’ is to be understood here as requiring some form
of instrumental or causal relation.
I turn now to (2), the interpersonality condition. We may think of it
as having two parts. The first is that Amust have intentionally acted so as
to bring about B’s doing x. Note the insufficiency of B’s merely believing
that A has gotten her to do x—as would be the case, for instance, were
you to mishear the highwayman and start telling a joke, thinking that
he is demanding (something) funny. In such a case you might certainly
feel subject to his will. But you would not in fact be subject to his will;
indeed, your action would serve to frustrate his will. This is to say that42. Raz,Morality of Freedom, 152. See also Mark Fowler, “Coercion and Practical Reason,”
Social Theory and Practice 8 (1982): 329–55; Olsaretti, Liberty, Desert and theMarket, 154 (though,
unlike Raz, Olsaretti construes needs objectively).
43. “Pure” cases of subservience or obedience, in which one’s will is nonforcibly sub-
ordinated to that of another, may qualify as a form of the third of the three modes of in-
terpersonal subjection distinguished above. They do not, however, fall within the scope of
the analysis developed here.
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Ainterpersonal subjection, like other eudaimonic bads such as ignorance
and irrationality, is not a purely subjective state. To be sure, the purely sub-
jective aspectof interpersonal subjection—takingoneself tohave “nochoice”
but to act in accordance with what one believes to be the will of another—
is its own unhappy condition. But it is not our focus. For if there is no rel-
evant foreign will, then there is no successful exercise of interpersonal
power, no subordination of interests, and no subservience to others. One
cannot be subject to a nonexistent will.44
The second part is that A must have gotten B to do x by a certain
means. In the standard (nondeceptive) case,Amust have done so by help-
ing to make it true that B has “no choice” but to comply with A’s will. It is
not enough that A merely alert B to this fact. If I warn you about an un-
safe bridge and you change your route accordingly, you are not thereby
subject tomy will. Of course,matters would be different if I had previously
sabotaged the bridge so as to force you to change your route. They would
be different too if I were merely lying about the bridge in order to get you
to change your route. For when it is false that you have “no choice” but to
change your route, I can nevertheless subject you tomy will by getting you
to believe that you do.45
I turn finally to (3), the nonconformity of wills condition. To see its
point, consider a case of an altruistically motivated unconditional offer.
Suppose that you are in terrible pain, with no access to painkillers, and
that I give you a painkiller with the intention that you take it to relieve
your pain.46 In doing so, I help to make it true that taking the pill is your
sole available means of avoiding a terrible alternative. Nevertheless, the
reason for which I have gotten you to take the pill—relief of your pain—
is the very same reason that motivates you to take the pill. And this confor-44. This may, however, be subject to the following proviso. Suppose that a mafia boss
tells you, “Get me my money by Friday, or you’re dead,” adding, “I don’t care how you do
it—just do it.” Suppose further that, as it happens, you have exactly one available means
of getting themoney by Friday: pawning your prized guitar. So you pawn your guitar and give
themafia boss themoney. Clearly, you give themafia boss themoney under coercion. But do
you also pawn your guitar under coercion? Those inclined to answer “yes” (on the grounds
that the scope of the mafioso’s will might extend unwittingly in this way) should append the
following clause to the end of condition (2): “or has successfully so acted with respect to y,
where x isB’s sole availablemeans of doing y.”Those inclined to answer “no” (on the grounds
that coercion must bemore strictly intentional) should leave the condition as it stands. None
of the arguments of this article turn on this issue.
45. What if I lie about the bridge being unsafe but, unbeknownst to me, it really is un-
safe? Then I have inadvertently given you a warning and failed in my attempt to subject you
to my will.
46. Note the variant case in which I act only so as to enable you to relieve your pain—
that is, in order to give you an option that you may or may not choose to take—and there-
fore not so as to get you to relieve your pain. Such a case would not be one of subjection (by
virtue of its failing condition [2]).
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Amity in our wills means that although you have been subjected to my will,
you have not thereby been subjected to a will that is relevantly foreign to
your own. By contrast, suppose that the pill I offer you is a new drug,
and that in addition to wanting to get you to relieve your pain I also want
to make you test the drug. If you do not share this aim of testing the drug,
then in taking it you are subject to my foreign will (with respect to testing
the drug, though not with respect to relieving your pain).
Whereas unconditional offers frequently do involve the right kind of
conformity of wills, conditional offers and threats typically do not. Never-
theless, they may do so. Suppose, for instance, that you are so moved by the
highwayman’s apparent desperation that, in addition to being motivated
by self-preservation, you also hand over your money out of charity—and,
moreover, that your charitablemotivation is so strong that you would have
done the same even if youhadnot beenunder threat (e.g., if youhadbeen
a bystander). In this case, the highwayman’s will (that he get some ready
cash) would not be relevantly foreign to your own, and you would not act
under subjection to a foreign will.
This, then, is what it is to be subject to a foreign will. My claim is that
a person suffers coercion in the eudaimonic sense just in case she suffers
some significant loss of freedom-as-nonsubjection.
V. THREE OBJECTIONS
Before relating this account of eudaimonic coercion back to the weighty
deontic senses of coercion and to the cases introduced at the end of Sec-
tion I, I must first defend it from three pressing objections. These are
that the account is too subjective, that subjection to a foreign will is un-
necessary for coercion, and that the account fails to take seriously the pos-
itive moral value of social dependence.
There are two versions of the “too subjective” worry. One concerns
the objective reasonableness of the agent’s ideas about her personal needs.
Suppose that a person, having livedher whole life in the lapof extreme lux-
ury, now considers the prospect of a middle-income lifestyle an unthink-
able hardship. On the proposed account, a threat to bring such a person
down to this material level—one that is, objectively, perfectly adequate—
could nevertheless be coercive. Somemay find this implausible. I suspect,
however, that this reaction rests on either of two errors. The first is a lin-
gering presumption that to call an action “coerced” is to excuse it, a deon-
tic consideration irrelevant to the idea of coercion in its eudaimonic role.
The second is a failure of imagination: it may be so difficult to empathize
with such a person that we resort to interpreting her as having amere pref-
erence against the drop in income. However, to work with the case, we
must take seriously the stipulation that she genuinely regards this option
as somehow ineligible, and it is then not implausible to think that sheThis content downloaded from 193.061.013.044 on June 19, 2018 09:04:43 AM
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Amight be subject to the will of one whomakes such a psychologically effec-
tive threat.
The other version of the “too subjective” worry concerns the sources
of the agent’s evaluative beliefs. Returning to Organ Sale, suppose that B
has adapted to his condition by forming an ascetic conception of the good
that venerates the struggle of lives lived in extreme poverty.47 In that case,
A’s offer would not be coercive, for B would not see the consequences of
declining it as bad.Again, this is the correct result. Assuming that the change
in B ’s evaluative scheme is genuine and not, for instance, just a matter of
self-deception, then he really is no longer vulnerable to such attempts at
subjection. In this respect the Stoics were right: ridding oneself ofmaterial
desires does indeed help to render one immune to certain sorts of inter-
personal control. (If you doubt this, try getting a Franciscan monk to do
your bidding via financial incentives.)
The second objection concerns a case given by Nozick:4
bridg
4
ll use Suppose that we are conducting an experiment for the Social Sci-
ence Research Council, to study people’s reactions in the highway-
man situation. We don’t care how he reacts to our threat (if he gives
over the money we must turn it over to the SSRC; if he resists we are
empowered to kill him and, let us suppose, have no moral scruples
about doing so). We do not say “Yourmoney or your life” in order to
get him to give us his money, but in order to gather data. . . . In the
grip of fear and trembling, he hands over the money. Surely we co-
erced him into doing so.48Since the scientist does not aim to get the subject to hand over his money,
it seems that in handing over his money the subject cannot qualify as act-
ing under subjection to the scientist’s will. Nevertheless, the subject is co-
erced. This suggests that subjection to a foreign will is unnecessary for co-
ercion.
Both the scientist and the more common highwayman aim to get
something from their victims, but they aim for different things. The com-
mon highwayman wants your money, and he gets it by threatening to
shoot you. Refusing to hand over your money (and getting yourself shot)
is therefore a way of frustrating his will. By contrast, the scientist wants
something disjunctive—either that she get your money or that you get
shot—and she does not get this by issuing a threat (“do either of these
two things or else”), but just by physically blocking off further alternatives.
In this case, the path of defiance lies not in either of the alternatives, but
only in one’s somehow breaking out of the constricted choice situation,7. See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge: Cam-
e University Press, 1983).
8. Nozick, “Coercion,” 18.
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Asuch as by running away. Hence, both cases involve subjection to a foreign
will, but the second, despite appearances, is not a case of subjection by
means of threat. In Section IV I distinguished three ways in which one
might be subject to a foreign will (and hence coerced); the proposed ac-
count concerns only the second of these, in which one’s options are rigged.
Nozick’s case, however, is best understoodas an instanceof thefirst of these,
in which one is physically compelled to undergo something. That is, al-
though it looks like the subjects are beingmade to do something bymeans
of a threat, they are in fact being made to do or undergo either of two
things by means of a physical constriction of their opportunity sets. They
are therefore coerced, but not in a manner that falls under the analysis
developed here.
The final objection runs as follows. Coercion, on my account, is the
loss of a certain kind of social independence. Yet we are all essentially
bound up in multiple and overlapping social relations and embedded
in complex social structures. Moreover, this social embeddedness is im-
mensely valuable. Even were it possible to sever ourselves from these re-
lations of social interdependence, it would be undesirable to do so. So if
coercion is a particular kind ofmoral bad, and if social dependence is not
a moral bad, then coercion cannot be a loss of social independence.49
However, social dependence comes in a variety of forms, and it is pos-
sible that some of these formsmight be disvaluable without all of them be-
ing so.50 Hence, my aim is not to deprecate social dependence, or indeed
social relations, in general; rather, it is to focus on a particular form of so-
cial dependence—what I have called subjection to a foreign will—and to
suggest that relations of social dependence are bad when they take this
specific form. Significantly, normal relations of love and care do not take
this form.
First, loving and caring actions are often unforced.When I cook din-
ner for my friends, for example, I do so primarily for the joy it will bring
them, not so as to avoid some feared alternative. (Moreover, inasmuch as
I am partly motivated so as to avoid their disappointment at my not cook-
ing, fortunately neither they nor I are so fragile that this consideration
leaves me, in the relevant sense, “no choice” but to cook for them.) Sec-
ond, even whenwe are compelled to act in virtue of our love for someone,
it is still generally the case that we are not thereby subject to a foreign will.
On the one hand, contexts of love and care typically manifest the kind of
conformity of wills necessary to defeat the foreignness condition. Thus,49. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
50. Marilyn Friedman, “Relational Autonomy and Independence,” in Autonomy, Op-
pression, and Gender, ed. Andrea Veltman and Mark Piper (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014), 42–60.
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Asuppose that my baby is hungry and signals for me to feed her. Since the
prospect of my baby going hungry is relevantly bad for me, it may be that
in this circumstance I have “no choice” but to feed her. Yet my reason for
feeding her and her reason for gettingme to feed her are the same: relief
of her hunger. On the other hand, dispositions of love and care are typ-
ically dispositions to act in another’s interests, and this means that they
do not usually involve the kind of dependence on another’s will required
by the interpersonality condition. In the example just given, for instance,
my baby has not made it the case that she will go hungry if I do not feed
her. This is a fact about her physiology and developmental stage indepen-
dent of her will. So while her action alerts me to the fact that I must feed
her, it does not help to make this fact obtain.51
Hence, close personal relationships need not involve interpersonal
subjection. Needless to say, however, they can. In Personal Ultimatum, for
instance, B believes that it would be emotionally catastrophic to be left by
A, andA uses this fact to get B to serveA’s will by threatening to leave B. In
this case, B’s energy and activity are not being directed toward formu-
lating and pursuing B’s own plans and purposes, but toward those of an-
other. Moreover, this is, in a delicate but important sense, not a willing
subordination of B’s will, born from an overflowing of love and care and
a mutual fusing of interests, but a morbid subordination born from fear.
As I have been arguing, one of the jobs of the concept of coercion is to pick
out precisely this species of harm.
VI. OVERLAPPING CONCEPTS
I turn now to the relationship between this primarily eudaimonic concept
of coercion and the weightily deontic concept reviewed earlier. On the
account just proposed, coercion in the eudaimonic sense is neither neces-
sary nor sufficient for coercion in the weighty deontic sense.52 Hence, the51. What about cases in which one’s loved one’s autonomy is centrally at stake? If one
cares sufficiently about the other’s autonomy, then in certain situations the other’s re-
quests may necessitate one’s compliance simply qua requests. However, in these situations
one’s compliance is not a means of avoiding an autonomy violation; it just is avoiding an
autonomy violation. That is, just as one is not forced to see one’s favorite band simply by
the strength of one’s desire to see them, one is not forced to respect someone’s autonomy
just by the strength of one’s own commitment to respecting their autonomy (see Sec. IV).
52. This is true despite the following two complications. First, since interpersonal subjec-
tion is a harm, and since it is always prima facie wrong to harmothers, it follows that it is always
prima facie wrong to subject others to one’s will. However, this prima facie wrong—that is, the
prima facie wrong automatically generated by the harmfulness of interpersonal subjection—is
generally too weak to play the weighty deontic roles demanded by the deontic concept of co-
ercion. Second, itmay be that particularly severe instances of interpersonal subjection are ipso
facto rights violations and therefore wrongful in the weighty deontic sense. Consider the fol-
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Aset of cases involving eudaimonic coercion partially overlaps the set of cases
involving weighty deontic coercion, and this yields three distinct kinds
of cases (respectively located in the intersection and each of the two rela-
tive complements of the overlapping sets): cases involving coercion inboth
senses, cases involving coercion in only the primarily eudaimonic sense,
and cases involving coercion in only the weighty deontic sense. Moreover,
this way of seeing things helpsmake sense of our everyday understanding of
coercion in the following way. Like many ordinary concepts, that of coer-
cion admits of both clear or paradigm cases and unclear or penumbral
cases. As I suggest below, it turns out that what we naturally think of as par-
adigm cases of coercion generally lie in the intersection (that is, they in-
volve coercion in both senses), whereas more penumbral cases lie in one
or other of the relative complements.
For instance, the highwayman case—an obviously paradigmatic case
of coercion—involves coercion in both the weighty deontic sense (you are
wronged, the resulting transaction is invalid) and the primarily eudai-
monic sense (you suffer the pro tanto bad of subjection to a foreign will),
and this is likely true of all cases involving clear and serious threats. More-
over, this explains why the distinction between the two senses of coercion
is easy to miss, for in central cases there is generally no pressing analyti-
cal need to pry them apart. In more controversial cases, however, the two
forms of coercion diverge, and understanding their distinctness becomes
essential.
Indeed, the two come apart precisely in cases like those introduced at
the end of Section I. As we saw there, it is unlikely that any of these involve
coercion in the weighty deontic sense. Nevertheless, they all—given plau-
sible background assumptions—involve coercion in the eudaimonic sense
defended here. TakeOrgan Sale (a paradigmatic case of a “coercive offer”).
Here B transfers his kidney to A on the grounds that this is his sole avail-
able means of avoiding an eventuality—imminent starvation—that would
surpass a relevant threshold of badness. A has gotten B to transfer his kid-
ney by helping to make it the case, via his offer, that doing so is indeed B’s
sole availablemeans of avoiding imminent starvation. AndA has done this
so that he might have a kidney, whereas B has transferred his kidney inlowing analogy. Ifmy (otherwise-rightful) acquisitionof land leaves you entirely hemmed in by
my property, and in effect prevented frommoving, it may thereby be wrongful. That is, it may
be that you have a right to some minimal degree of freedom-as-nonprevention, and that this
legitimately constrains how Imay exercisemy rights. In the sameway, itmay be that you have a
right to someminimal degree of freedom-as-nonsubjection, and that this also legitimately con-
strains how I may exercise my rights. Thus it may be that, in the most severe cases of “pure”
eudaimonic coercion, in subjecting B to her will A acts not only badly but also wrongly (in a
narrow, rights-violating sense).
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Aorder to avoid starvation.53 Thus, B is subjected to A’s will and is thereby
coerced.
Of course, the fact that B accepts the deal suggests that he takes the
harm of interpersonal subjection to be outweighed by other gains (such
as avoiding imminent starvation), and so the result is likely an overall in-
crease in his eudaimonic state. Nevertheless, the transaction involves var-
ious pro tanto eudaimonic setbacks, one of which is loss of his kidney, and
another of which is subjection to a foreign will. The claim that B is co-
erced is here simply the claim thatB suffers the latter pro tanto harm.Note
also that, on this approach, the coerciveness of a transaction is treated as
distinct from its exploitativeness. It is widely held that A exploits B just in
case A takes unfair advantage of B.54 Thus, in Organ Sale B is both coerced
and exploited. However, hadA offered B amillion dollars for his kidney, B
would have been just as coerced—he still would have had “no choice” but
to comply with A’s will—but it would be much harder to sustain the claim
that he was exploited. ‘Exploitation’ and ‘coercion’ pick out differentmo-
ral phenomena.55
These points apply to “coercive offer” cases generally and help ex-
plain why they are so controversial. For as we are now in a position to
see, whether we take them to involve coercion depends on our broader
moral-theoretic objectives. Hence, if we are interested in whether A has
wronged B, or in whether it is legitimate to hold B fully responsible for
making the agreement—that is, if these are the sorts of questions we hope
to get closer to answering by determining whether B has been coerced—
then we may well deem B uncoerced in these cases (as per the standard
moralized account). But if our primary moral interest is in how well B’s
life is going, and specifically in how much of the special human good of
nonsubjection to foreign wills B currently enjoys, then we may well deem
B coerced.
It is notable that almost all of themost interesting “penumbral” cases
of coercion lie to this side of the intersection. Nevertheless, it is also pos-53. I here assume that both A and B act primarily for their own benefit. Suppose, how-
ever, that they are friends: A suggests the deal in a genuine attempt to help B out (A lacks
the means to aid B unconditionally, but A is able to sell the kidney on and to give B the ma-
jority of the earnings), while B is happy to give A the opportunity to get a small cut of the
earnings (A is also, we may suppose, hard up). Thus, B transfers his kidney both to avoid
starvation and to benefit A, and A gets B to transfer his kidney both to prevent B’s starving
and to benefit himself. Such a conformity of wills would mean that B is not coerced in this
case. (Needless to say, however, these are not the standard conditions of capitalist market
exchange. I briefly return to this issue in Sec. VII; see n. 59.)
54. See AlanWertheimer, Exploitation (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1996),
439.
55. See Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, 81: “An enforced increase
of wages . . . would therefore be nothing but better payment for the slave.”
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Asible to construct cases on the other side—that is, cases involving deontic
but not eudaimonic coercion. Moreover, it is a prediction of the ap-
proach propounded here that such cases should seem similarly “penum-
bral” and controversial. With this in mind, consider the following:5
ll use Customs Official. B is an extremely wealthy traveler. A, a customs offi-
cial, threatens to seize one of B’s many neckties unless B pays a bribe
of $100. The tie has no sentimental value to B and could easily be re-
placed, albeit for $110—a sum that B can amply afford. (By contrast,
the tie would have little resale value for A.) A’s threat is spurious and
illegal, but B has no realistic chance of redress in this jurisdiction.
B pays the bribe.ForB, replacing the tie would be aminor inconvenience, and he could eas-
ily choose to stand up to A’s threat—on moral principle, say, or just so as
not to be pushed around. That is, B is not in a position in which we would
ordinarily regard him as having “no choice” but to comply with A’s wishes.
Nevertheless, he has clearly been wronged. Has he been coerced?
In the weighty deontic sense, he has: A secured his compliance by
proposing to violate his property rights, and B retains a moral claim to
his $100 on the grounds that he gave it under coercion. In the primarily
eudaimonic sense outlined here, however, he has not: although he chose
to act in accordance with A’s will (for obvious reasons of mild economic
self-interest), he was at no point subject to it; although he lost his necktie,
he retained his independence. Cases like this, which we may term “non-
coercive threat” cases, are themirror image of “coercive offer” cases, and,
I submit, they are intuitively unclear in a very similar way (i.e., intuitions
are likely to diverge significantly).
This, then, is how we might think, at least in broad outline, about the
relationship between the two concepts of coercion.Moreover, this approach
also allows us to make sense of, and promises to resolve, the long-standing
dispute about whether coercion is an essentially moralized concept. For we
now see that it is both: the “moralizers” and the “nonmoralizers” are each
partly right. As we saw in Section I, when understood in its weighty deontic
senses, coercion seems to demand a moralized analysis. On the proposed
eudaimonic account, by contrast, it does not: no independentmoral criteria
are needed to determine whether an agent is subject to a foreign will. (Cru-
cially, what matters on the account is not the actual badness of the alterna-
tives, but onlyB’s beliefs about their badness.) Among other things, this lays
the foundations for an explanation of how the idea of coercion might con-
sistently enter a moral or political theory on the ground floor, as part of a
basic moral principle, despite its obviously moralized dimensions.566. See Zimmerman, “Taking Liberties.”
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AVII. IMPLICATIONS: CAPITALIST WAGE RELATIONS
There are a number of important questions inmoral and political philos-
ophy that seem to turn, at least in part, on the nature of coercion, and it is
with an eye to making progress with these that most philosophical inves-
tigations into the concept are undertaken. These questions include long-
standing disputes over the coerciveness of capitalism and the law, as well
as a host of newer problems in applied ethics such as the coerciveness of
payment for participation in medical research, the coerciveness of mar-
kets in human tissues and organs, and the coerciveness of markets in hu-
man reproduction.What, it may be asked, are the implications of the fore-
going analysis for debates such as these?
While it would obviously be impossible to explore the implications
of this approach for all of these here, it might nevertheless be possible to
shine some general light onmany of them by considering just one in par-
ticular. To this end I therefore now look—albeit still only briefly and in
broad outline—at the well-worn dispute concerning the coerciveness (or
otherwise) of capitalist wage relations.
This debate typically focuses on “coercive offer” cases such as the
following:5
is whe
that B
tion w
ll use Proletarian. B lives in a pure capitalist system and owns no property
other than himself. A, who bears no direct responsibility for B’s sit-
uation, offers B a hazardous job at paltry wages. B has no prospects
of other work or assistance, and if he declines the job, he will likely
starve. For this reason, B accepts the job.Is B coerced? As I have been arguing, in asking this question wemay have
either of two general moral-theoretical aims. The first is tomake progress
toward finding answers to the following questions: Has A acted in a way
that is significantly wrongful? Is B’s employment contract enforceable?
On the best understanding of coercion in the senses most immediately
relevant to these questions—that is, its weighty deontic senses—B is co-
erced only if A proposed to act all-things-considered wrongfully.57 And
since itmay be reasonably argued thatAproposed to act within her rights,
this result tends to favor defenders of capitalism.
How so? Well, it is presumably not wrong for A to offer B a job per
se. So if A’s proposal is wrongful, it must be because she has some posi-
tive duty to offer B a job on better terms, or to provide some other form
of assistance. But even if A does have such a duty in certain cases, this is7. Note that what matters with respect to these questions for the moralized account
ther B’s rights are violated by A, not by the government or by society at large. The fact
may have a right to assistance from others is irrelevant, on that account, to the ques-
hether A coerces B. See Wertheimer, Coercion, 234–41.
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Aunlikely to support a general conclusion concerning the coerciveness of
capitalist wage relations. For one thing, market conditions may be such
that A cannot offer the job on better terms without going out of business,
and A presumably has no duty to aid others where doing so will push her
into destitution herself. For another thing, A’s duty of assistance is likely
owed to those most in need of it, and this may not include B (others may
be even worse off).
For these reasons, it is difficult to sustain the claim that transactions
like that in Proletarian are generally coercive in a weighty deontic sense.
Moreover, as we saw in Section I, it is often insisted that this is the onlymor-
ally interesting sense of coercion, amove that effectively closes the capital-
ist’s case. Yet, as I have argued, this relies on too narrow a conception of
what is morally interesting. In asking whether B has been coerced, our pri-
mary aimmay not be to discover whether Bhas been wronged, or whetherB
may beheld to his contract. Instead, our aimmay be to establish howwellB’s
life is going and, more specifically, whether B is being precluded from the
enjoyment of a specific human good, namely, freedom-as-nonsubjection.
Moreover, it may reasonably be argued that in this different, eudaimonic
sense, B is subject to A’s will and therefore is coerced into accepting the
job (indeed, Proletarian is amenable to the same analysis as Organ Sale).58
The upshot of all this is that capitalists and socialists are likely both
right: it is both true that workers likeB are coerced (in theprimarily eudai-
monic sense) and true that they are not (in the weighty deontic sense).
But what does this mean for the bigger and more interesting issue of the
justification of capitalism?
The answer, of course, depends on one’s broader political morality.
For a strict deontic liberal, for instance, whether capitalist wage relations
are bad is politically irrelevant; whatmatters is just whether they are wrong-
ful. From this perspective, therefore, ideal capitalist wage relations are
most likely not coercive in any politically relevant sense. Hence, those
whowish to contest capitalism on purely deonticmoral terrain will do well58. A specific worry that might arise in this context is that the account is overly indi-
vidualistic. Suppose that B is offered a similar job by C, and that both offers constitute ac-
ceptable alternatives from B’s point of view. Then B is no longer subject to A’s will, for he
has an acceptable alternative, namely, working for C; further, he is not subject to C ’s will,
for he has the option of working for A. So B is subject to no foreign will and suffers no co-
ercion. In response, note first that the individualism generating the concern is extrinsic to
the proposed account; so, e.g., if sense can be made of the Marxian idea that social classes
qualify as quasi-agents in possession of wills (or will-analogues) of their own, then the ac-
count may deem workers to be coerced by capitalists as a class. Second, critics of capitalism
need not deny the principle that competition for labor among employers tends to dimin-
ish the coerciveness of proletarian employment (i.e., that competitive capitalism is at least
better for freedom than monopoly capitalism), for what really matters here will be how of-
ten, under real-world capitalist conditions, workers in fact find themselves in receipt of
multiple acceptable job offers.
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Ato base their critique on matters other than coercion, such as distributive
injustice or exploitation.
For perfectionists, by contrast, the possibility that capitalism typically
hampers the realization of freedom-as-nonsubjection for significant parts
of the population is highly relevant to its justification.59 Indeed, from this
perspective such a result could well form an important plank of a more
general anticapitalist argument. Such an argument would, however, re-
quire two further elements: first, a comprehensive accounting of the var-
ious moral harms and benefits of capitalism (coercion being just one of
them), and second, a demonstration that an alternative formof economic
organization could fare significantly better overall in relation to these same
harms and benefits. As this suggests, it is by no means a short dialectical
path, even for a perfectionist, from the claim that capitalism is inherently
coercive to the claim that it is unjustified. Nevertheless, such a coercion
claim is, for them, one potentially laden with genuine political significance.
To illustrate these points further, consider Serena Olsaretti’s recent
and influential critique of “libertarian” capitalism.60 Although primar-
ily concerned not with the concept of coercion but with that of volun-
tariness—her target being the claim that ideal capitalist transactions are
always fully voluntary—closely parallel considerations apply. Olsaretti’s
strategy is to develop a plausible account of voluntariness and then to
use it to show thatmany capitalist transactions—including that in Proletar-
ian—are involuntary. However, there is a sense in which she ends up talk-
ing past the libertarian, and this is related to the fact that, as with coer-
cion, the idea of voluntariness does a variety of moral jobs for us.
In fact, it does at least three. One is the primarily eudaimonic job of
helping to specify what it is to live a freely chosen life, an aspect of the
good often referred to as “autonomy” by perfectionist liberals.61 The sec-
ond is the deontic job of helping to specify when it is morally permissible
(and when impermissible) to hold a person liable for the consequences59. Note that it is specifically capitalism, as opposed tomarket exchangemore generally,
that generates the worry about coercion. As I pointed out in n. 53 with respect to Organ Sale,
the right kind of conformity between the parties’ wills may render an otherwise-coercive offer
noncoercive. However, the self-interested basis of paradigmatic capitalist exchange typically
precludes such conformity. In particular, it is rare for business owners, despite talk of “job cre-
ation,” to be motivated by a genuine concern for the financial well-being of their workers (in-
deed, they would likely automate such jobs if it were cheaper to do so), and it is even rarer for
workers to bemotivated by an altruistic concern for their bosses’profitmargins.Matters could
in principle be different, however, under some more cooperative, alternative form of eco-
nomic organization. Although there is not the space to develop the point fully here, this is
another respect in which recognition of the eudaimonic concept of coercion helps to make
sense of important themes in the socialist tradition.
60. Olsaretti, Liberty, Desert and the Market, 86–161.
61. See, e.g., Raz, Morality of Freedom; Ben Colburn, “Forbidden Ways of Life,” Philo-
sophical Quarterly 58 (2008): 618–29.
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Aof her actions. The third is the different deontic job of helping to specify
when a decision or action has been subject to impermissible or wrongful
interference on the part of other agents. Olsaretti focuses on voluntari-
ness explicitly in the second, and sometimes implicitly in the first, of these
roles,62 and she successfully argues that capitalist transactions are often in-
voluntary in these senses.However, it is in its third role that thenotion is of
ultimatemoral importance for libertarian capitalists. That is, for them the
core claim with respect to voluntariness is not (1) that under capitalism
each lives a flourishing human life, nor is it (2) that, insofar as people’s
lives go badly under capitalism, they have no one to blame but themselves
(to the contrary, libertarians are often happy to blame impersonal, exter-
nal circumstances for people’s hardships). Rather, the fundamental claim
is (3) that insofar as people’s lives go badly under capitalism, they cannot
blame anyone else: they have not been wronged, and capitalism is thereby
vindicated as perfectly rightful.63
As Olsaretti’s arguments bring to light, libertarians are not always
very careful about distinguishing (1)–(3), and her critique is invaluable
for denying the libertarian unjust dialectical enrichment on the basis of
that confusion. But to fully refute the libertarian on her own terms, one
must counter (3), and that is difficult for precisely the same reasons that
it is difficult to show that, in Proletarian, B is coerced in the weighty deon-
tic sense.
Hence, the argument over the coerciveness (as well as the voluntari-
ness) of capitalism—specifically, the dispute over whether capitalism is co-
ercive in a sense relevant to its political justification—ultimately rests, in
part, on a deeper disagreement concerning the relationship between the
right and the good. Moreover, although I have not been able to demon-
strate it here in detail, I submit that many of our specific philosophical dis-
agreements on issues relating to coercion have a similar ultimate source. If
so, our moral understanding of these issues can only benefit from better
recognition of the dual moral-theoretic roles played by that idea: coercion
as moral wrong, and coercion as moral bad.62. Olsaretti, Liberty, Desert and the Market, 158–61; Serena Olsaretti, “Debate: The
Concept of Voluntariness—a Reply,” Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2008): 112–21. Note
that these two normative roles may not demand distinct conceptual analyses.
63. See Barnes, “Why Is Coercion Unjust?”
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